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Abstract 
In early 1998 the government of Indonesia established several Social Safety Net 
(SSN) programs, in order to help protect the poor and the newly poor resulting from 
the economic crisis. This study assesses the impact of these government’s initiatives 
and the findings indicate that the participation of the community in the SSN programs 
generally had positive impact on household consumption. However, only participation 
in the subsidized rice program significantly reduced the probability of a non-poor 
household falling into poverty. Similarly, the impact of participation in the SSN 
programs on the probability for poor households to move out of poverty is also largely 
insignificant. This implies that the benefits accrued to poor households from the SSN 
program are too small to have a significant impact on their likelihood of escaping 
poverty. Hence, despite the short term success of the SSN programs in alleviating 
some of the worst effects of the crisis, the program were not an effective tool for 
social redistribution.  
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I.  Introduction 
Prior to the Asian crisis, Indonesia had one of the most rapid growth 
experiences of any country in the world.  That rapid economic growth had broad 
based benefits and was accompanied by significant improvements in living standards: 
poverty — by any standard — fell dramatically. For example, between 1970 and 1996 
the proportion of the population living below the official poverty line fell by almost 
50 percentage points (from 60 percent to 11 percent). Infant mortality rates fell, 
school enrollment rates rose, and the provision of basic infrastructure facilities — 
water, roads, electricity — expanded significantly. In fact, Indonesia was considered 
to be one of the most successful countries in the endeavor to reduce poverty.  
On the other hand, Indonesians had never relied heavily on government safety 
net programs, and wisely so.  The country has neither the economic apparatus nor the 
political mechanism required to deliver large scale, widespread, transfer programs. 
Social spending was largely focussed on ‘social services’, with the family and 
communities providing ‘social insurance’. Exceptions to this are social security 
schemes mandated for employees in medium and large enterprises (Jamsostek), public 
service (Taspen), the military (Asabri), and health insurance for employees (Askes).
1
 
As events evolved during the crisis, these schemes proved ineffective to as forms of 
social protection for the majority of population, simply because they excluded most of 
the population, particularly the poor. In addition, there were also some subsidized 
health schemes, but Indonesia did not have a social safety net system like the one 
which exists today. Establishing the social safety net in Indonesia in 1998 was 
therefore more of a case of casting a new net rather than expanding an existing one. 
The outbreak of the Indonesian crisis in late 1997 has forced Indonesian 
households to adjust to the first serious economic contraction in years. Throughout 
1998 real economic growth was –13.7 percent.2 This was a sharp turn around from the 
high growth of the previous three decades, which averaged over 7 percent annually. 
The social impact of this large economic contraction was also substantial. The poverty 
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rate increased by 164 percent from the immediate pre-crisis level in mid 1997 to the 
peak of the crisis by the end of 1998.
3
 In the labor market, even though the open 
unemployment rate slightly only increased from 4.7 percent in August 1997 to 5.5 
percent in August 1998, real wages fell by around one third during the same period.
4
 
One year later, real wage growth has returned to positive in most sectors, but the 
unemployment rate has continued to climb, reaching 6.4 percent by 1999. 
Therefore, the response of the government to the impending social impact of 
the crisis was to launch the so-called social safety net programs in early 1998. These 
are a set of new as well as expanded initiatives widely known as the “JPS” programs, 
an acronym of the Indonesian term for social safety net, Jaring Pengaman Sosial.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section two revisits the 
discussions on the social impact of the crisis. Section three reviews the newly 
established social safety net programs and the methods of targeting used as a response 
to the crisis. Section four examines the performance of these social safety programs. 
Section five discusses the interactions between those JPS programs where there has 
been significant involvement with community and sectoral programs.  Finally, section 
six summarizes the lessons learned from the social safety net and poverty reduction 
programs and concludes the discussion with some policy recommendations.  
  
II.  Background to the Indonesian Crisis  
Throughout 1998, Indonesia was mired in a deep political and economic crisis. 
The crisis in the financial sector was one of the worst in the world’s modern history, 
requiring half of Indonesia’s total GDP to fix as loan recovery rates revealed massive 
losses. The value of the Indonesian rupiah plummeted from a pre-crisis level of 
approximately Rp 2,500 per US dollar to around Rp 15,000 in mid 1998. The crisis 
resulted in a 13.7 percent drop in real GDP in 1998.  The construction sector was 
severely hit (-39.8 percent), followed by the financial sector (-26.7 percent), trade, 
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hotels and restaurants (-18.9 percent). Meanwhile, the agricultural and utility sectors 
continued to  experience positive growth at around 0.2 and 3.7 percent respectively.  
The economic crisis has also tremendous impact on inflation which reached 78 
percent in 1998, where food prices escalated by an estimated 118 percent in the same 
period. These price increases and related food shortages strongly affected the poor. 
For example, on average health expenditure declined by 20.5 percent at the height of 
the crisis. Household expenditures on health declined even faster than overall 
expenditures — the share of overall spending going to healthcare decreased by 14 
percent for urban and 40 percent for rural households. 
 
A.  The Poverty Rate, Characteristics of the Poor, and Vulnerability 
There have been several studies to assess the impact of the crisis on the life of 
households throughout Indonesia.
5
 Data gathered by the Government Bureau of 
Statistics in a survey known as SUSENAS in 1996 and 1999 indicated that the crisis 
has resulted in a substantial increase in poverty.
6
 According to one estimate the 
national poverty rate increased from 15.7 percent in February 1996 to 27.1 percent in 
February 1999.
7
 The number of urban poor has doubled, while we have seen a 75 
percent increase in the number of rural poor. A study tracking poverty over the course 
of the crisis is shown in Figure 1. It indicates that the poverty index increased from 
100 just before the crisis in mid 1997 to 264 at the peak of the crisis by the end of 
1998.
8
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Figure 1:  Estimates of Poverty in Indonesia During the Crisis 
Source:  Suryahadi et al (2000) 
 
The poor tend to have low education, work in agriculture, and live in rural 
areas. Eighty seven percent of the poor live in households in which the head of 
household has a primary school education or less, while only 5 percent of the poor 
have a secondary school education or better. Almost 60 percent of the poor are in 
households where agriculture is the main source of income (whether from labor or 
land). Even though the “modern” sector has a quarter of all workers, they only have 
15 percent of the poor.  In keeping with that, fully three quarters of the poor live in 
rural areas.
9
 
Determining exactly who should be classified as “the poor” is a difficult  task 
since who the poor are at any point in time is very fluid, and people and households 
enter and exit periods of poverty frequently. In Table 1 we reproduce a poverty 
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transition matrix from Skoufias et al (2000).
10
 Although during the crisis many of the 
households that were marginally poor before the crisis became impoverished, the 
transition matrix reveals considerable fluidity. Approximately 31 percent of the poor 
in 1997 moved out of poverty in 1998, although mainly to the category of near poor 
(17.52 percent). Also, 44.53 percent of the near poor in 1997 became poor in 1998, 
but there were also 17 percent which managed to become non-poor. But more 
surprisingly, almost 17 percent of poor households in 1998 were near non-poor and 
more than a quarter (26.24 percent) were non-poor in 1997. These are the households 
which in 1997 had expenditures more than 25 and 50 percent above the poverty line 
respectively. Only 35 percent of the poor in 1998 are those who were also poor in 
1997. This implies that reaching the poor in 1998 will be difficult, as many families 
who otherwise would not have been at all poor have suffered large reversals of 
fortune during the crisis and has become poor. 
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Table 1. Poverty Transition Matrix 
  Poverty Status in 1998 
 Total 1997 Poor Near Poor Near Non-
Poor 
Non-Poor 
 Total 1998 8,141 1,997 1,369 1,213 3,562 
 - row percentage 100.00 24.53 16.82 14.90 43.75 
 - column percentage 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 - total percentage  100.00 24.53 16.82 14.90 43.75 
 
P
o
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Poor 1,010 697 177 78 58 
- row percentage 100.00 69.01 17.52 7.72 5.74 
- column percentage 12.41 34.90 12.93 6.43 1.63 
- total percentage  12.41 8.56 2.17 0.96 0.71 
Near Poor 988 440 239 140 169 
- row percentage 100.00 44.53 24.19 14.17 17.11 
- column percentage 12.14 22.03 17.46 11.54 4.74 
- total percentage  12.14 5.40 2.94 1.72 2.08 
Near Non-Poor  1,114 336 282 190 306 
- row percentage 100.00 30.16 25.31 17.06 27.47 
- column percentage 13.68 16.83 20.60 15.66 8.59 
- total percentage  13.68 4.13 3.46 2.33 3.76 
Non-Poor  5,029 524 671 805 3,029 
- row percentage 100.00 10.42 13.34 16.01 60.23 
- column percentage 61.77 26.24 49.01 66.36 85.04 
- total percentage  61.77 6.44 8.24 9.89 37.21 
Notes: 
Poor: PCE < PL, Near Poor: PL  PCE < 1.25*PL,  
Near Non-Poor: 1.25*PL  PCE <1.5*PL, Non-Poor: PCE  1.5*PL 
PCE = Per capita expenditure, PL = Poverty line 
Source:  Skoufias et al (2000) 
 
This also means that a large swath of the Indonesian population that is today 
not poor is nevertheless “at risk” of poverty. Any adverse shock to their incomes (or 
necessary expenditures) could easily force them under the line into poverty. Even if 
only 27 percent of population are poor now, between 30 and 60 percent of population 
are vulnerable to poverty over a three-year horizon. Furthermore, vulnerability to 
poverty varies across population groups. Table 2 reproduces estimates of vulnerable 
population across various groups of population from Pritchett et al (2000).
12
 The table 
reveals the following: households headed by a female are more vulnerable to poverty 
                                                          
12
 The calculations are based on an assumption of a 20 percent overall poverty rate.  The data used are a 
panel of 10,000 households surveyed in “Mini-SUSENAS” in December 1998 and August 1999. 
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than households headed by a male, the lower the education level of a household head 
the more vulnerable the household is to poverty, rural households are more vulnerable 
to poverty than urban households, while among rural households the landless are 
more vulnerable to poverty than landed households. Finally, households in the 
agriculture sector have a much higher degree of vulnerability to poverty than 
households in other sectors. 
 
Table 2:  Estimates of poverty and vulnerability across groups 
 
 
 
Mean of log 
percapita 
expenditures 
in the initial 
period 
Headcount 
poverty 
rate (%) 
Yearly 
coefficient 
of variability 
Average 
vulnerability 
for three 
annual shocks 
Headcount 
vulnerable 
rate (%) 
Ratio of 
vulnerable 
to poor 
By gender:       
a. Male 10.9009 20.50 0.0392 0.3899 47.11 2.30 
b. Female 10.9071 21.23 0.0440 0.4410 50.97 2.40 
       
By education:       
a. Less than primary 10.6840 32.04 0.0404 0.6611 64.94 2.03 
b. Primary 10.8279 21.15 0.0381 0.4624 49.67 2.35 
c. Lower secondary 11.0430 10.06 0.0399 0.2544 34.20 3.40 
d. Upper secondary & higher 11.3333 4.24 0.0399 0.0783 17.69 4.17 
       
By urban-rural:       
a. Urban 11.1640 7.93 0.0405 0.1697 29.10 3.67 
b. Rural 10.7284 28.88 0.0389 0.5963 59.17 2.05 
       
By land owning (rural households only):      
a. Landless 10.4631 58.30 0.0318 0.8732 75.74 1.30 
b. Landed 10.7325 28.42 0.0390 0.5919 58.87 2.07 
       
By sector:       
a. Agriculture 10.6567 33.76 0.0389 0.6837 65.79 1.95 
b. Industry 10.9881 15.24 0.0381 0.2812 39.77 2.61 
c. Trade 11.0661 10.55 0.0416 0.2575 36.33 3.44 
d. Services 11.1270 9.46 0.0399 0.1867 30.50 3.22 
Source:  Pritchett et al (2000) 
 
B.  The Impact of the Crisis on Labor Market  
The crisis has also had tremendous effect on the labor market. Open 
unemployment continued to rise slightly, from 4.7 percent in 1997, to 5.5 percent in 
1998, and to 6.4 percent in 1999. The decline in real wages, however, has been far 
more important than unemployment in channeling the impact of the contraction in the 
   9 
labor market.
13
 Nevertheless, recent estimates of real wages by sector provide some 
hope. For most sectors we observe a substantial — more than 10 percent — increase 
in real wages between 1998 and 1999, except for the agriculture and mining sectors 
where real wages has continued to drop by 4 percent and 16 percent respectively.   
Another component of the impact of the crisis on the labor market has been 
shifts in employment for women. Many factories in the modern sector which 
employed young, mostly unmarried, and women were hit particularly hard during the 
crisis. However, in many households with children women have to take on additional 
paid work. As a result the fraction of women in the labor force in certain areas has 
actually risen. Finally, there have been various reports in certain rural areas changes 
in migration patterns that have affected the labor market so that certain agricultural 
tasks which were previously dominated by women are now being performed by men.   
 
C.  Coping Strategies 
It is important to understand that people are not merely passive victims of the 
Indonesian crisis, but have found ways to cope with the impact of these events by 
using their own initiatives, and also by relying on their families, friends, communities, 
and also (to varying degrees) by accessing government programs. A survey in 
December 1998 asked about how they had coped with the crisis. The results revealed 
three main strategies: reducing expenditures, borrowing, and attempting to raise 
incomes.
14
 In reducing expenditures, non-necessities were cut most frequently: 
clothing (68 percent) and recreation (53 percent) were the most frequently cut.  Then 
followed necessary expenses, such as reducing the quality of foods (52 percent) and 
reducing transportation expenses (48 percent).  Another 38 percent of the poor (but 
only 22 percent of non-poor) were even forced to reduce the quantity of food 
consumed. A second option for the poor was to maintain necessary expenditures by 
borrowing or selling assets.  The most frequent means to achieve this was to borrow 
from others, a method adopted by almost a third of the poor (and a quarter of the non-
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poor) during the crisis. The third option was trying to raise incomes.  In a flexible 
labor market, this can be achieved by taking additional jobs, working longer hours, or 
increasing the number of members of the family who are working. 
 
III.  The Indonesian Social Safety Net Programs 
A. Social Safety Net Programs as a Response to the Crisis 
At the onset of the Indonesian crisis, concern was raised over whether the 
considerable achievements that had been made in the health and education and in 
poverty reduction over the previous decades would be sustained. The Indonesian 
government reacted quickly and put in place a number of measures aimed at 
safeguarding real incomes as well as providing access to social services for the needy. 
Several new programs were launched, 
15
 which were intended to help protect the 
those who were already poor before the crisis as well as the newly poor as a result of  
the crisis through the following four strategies:  
(a) ensuring the availability of food to the poor at affordable prices,  
(b) supplementing purchasing power among poor households through employment 
creation,  
(c) preserving access of the poor to critical social services such as health and 
education, and  
(d) sustaining local economic activity through regional block grant programs and 
extension of small-scale credit.  
Table 3 recapitulates the areas and programs of this recently established Indonesian 
social safety net system. 
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Table 3. Areas and Programs of the Indonesian Social Safety Net 
Safety Net Area Program 
Food security Cheap rice program (OPK): sales of 
subsidized rice to targeted households 
Employment creation Padat Karya: a loose, uncoordinated collection 
of several ‘labor intensive’ programs operated 
through several government departments 
PDM-DKE: a ‘community fund’ program 
providing block grants directly to villages for 
either public works or as a revolving fund for 
credit 
Education Scholarships and Block Grants: providing  
 Scholarships directly to elementary (SD), 
junior secondary (SLTP), and senior 
secondary (SMU) students 
 Block grants to selected school. 
Health JPS-BK: a program providing subsidies for  
 Clinical services 
 Nutrition 
 Midwife services 
 
 
The programs launched to address the above areas were designed by the 
central government and were intended to have the following characteristics: quick 
disbursement, direct financing to beneficiaries, transparency, accountability, and 
widespread participation. However, as has been revealed by various studies, these 
intended characteristics have not always been achieved. 
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B.  Method of Targeting 
In general, the targeting for JPS programs is based on a combination of 
household and geographic targeting. Table 4 summarizes various targeting methods 
that have been adopted. 
 
 
Table 4. Targeting Mechanisms in JPS Programs 
Program and Targeting Method FY 98/99 FY 99/00 
OPK 
(Food Security) 
Geographic None None 
Household BKKBN (Family 
Planning 
Board)list 
BKKBN list with 
flexibility 
PDM-DKE 
(Employment 
creation, 
Community Funds 
for public works, 
Credit) 
Geographic Pre-crisis data Updated with 
Bappenas (national 
planning agency) 
regional data 
Household Local decision 
making 
Local decision 
making 
Padat Karya 
(Employment 
Creation) 
Geographic None, various 
ministries 
Urban areas, based 
on employment 
Household Weak self 
selection 
Self selection 
Scholarship and 
Block grants to 
schools 
Geographic Old data on 
enrollment 
Poverty updated to 
1998 
Household School committees 
following criteria 
School committees 
following criteria 
JPS-BK (Health) Geographic BKKBN pre-
posperous rates 
Updated pre-
posperous estimates 
to 1999 
Household BKKBN list BKKBN list with 
flexibility 
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The targeting for some programs is based on a household classification created 
by the National Family Planning Agency (BKKBN). According to this classification, 
households are grouped into four socio-economic status groups: ‘pre-prosperous’ 
(“pra-sejahtera” or PS), ‘prosperous I’ (“sejahtera I” or KS I), KS II, and KS III. The 
KS I to KS III categories are often lumped together as KS category.  In past years, 
eligible recipients for some JPS programs are only PS card holders, but for some 
programs eligibility was extended to include KS I households as well (e.g. OPK). This 
household-based targeting was used mostly for the cheap rice program (OPK) and the 
health program (JPS-BK). 
Padat karya (which means, as an adjective, ‘labor intensive’) is not a single 
program but rather collection of programs which were all aimed at employment 
creation. These programs were created as a response to the threat of burgeoning 
unemployment because of the economic contraction which had forced many firms to 
either lay off workers or shutdown completely.  In accordance with the urban nature 
of the crisis, the initial geographical targets for the first round of “crash” programs in 
FY 1997/98 were directed to urban areas plus some rural areas which had experienced 
harvest failures.   
Following on these ‘crash’ programs, in FY 1998/99 there was a proliferation of 
employment creation programs (padat karya) with more than a dozen in this category.  
These programs can be classified into four types.  First, some were on-going 
investment and infrastructure projects which were re-designed as labor-intensive 
projects. Second, other program, such as the Kecamatan Development Project, the 
Village Infrastructure Project, and PDM-DKE Community Fund Program gave block 
grants to local communities. These programs were directed to poor areas, and 
contained ‘menus’ that included the possibility of using funds for public works with a 
labor creating effect. A third set of programs were those special labor intensive 
schemes carried out by sectoral ministries (e.g. retraining of laid-off workers by the 
Ministry of Manpower). A fourth type of program were those ‘food for work’ 
programs, typically launched by international donors and NGOs in drought stricken 
   14 
areas.   
Unlike the food security program, those labor intensive programs were quite 
diverse. Although specific programs were targeted to certain areas (e.g. drought 
areas), lack of coordination meant there was little or no systematic overall geographic 
targeting. Within programs there were no clear guidelines about the intended 
participants; nor were there any fixed administrative criteria to select beneficiaries.  
Hence, targeting was primarily through self-selection: only those who were willing to 
work received benefits.  This self-selection mechanism has the advantage over 
administrative criteria of allowing individuals to choose to participate or not and 
creates the possibility of being more flexible to unobserved household shocks than 
administrative criteria.   
Another important JPS program is the scholarships and block grants program 
providing support to poor children and schools. The scholarships provide Rp.10,000, 
Rp.20,000 and Rp.30,000 per month for primary, lower secondary and upper 
secondary school students respectively. These amounts generally cover the cost of 
school fees and can be used for that purpose or to cover other expenses. In choosing 
the recipients of the scholarships, the program combined certain administrative 
criteria including factors such as the family BKKBN status, the size of the family, the 
likelihood of the children to dropping out from school and a school committee 
decision.  The  school committee consisted of the principal, the head teacher, and the 
head of the local parent’s association as the representative of the local community.  
Scholarships funds were first allocated to schools so that “poorer” schools 
received proportionally more individual scholarships. Scholarships were then 
allocated to individual students by school committees, which consisted of the school 
head teacher, the chair of the parents’ association, a teacher representative, a student 
representative, and the village head. School students in all but the lowest three grades 
of primary school were officially eligible. Participating students were to be selected 
from the poorest backgrounds. Committees were required to use household data from 
school records and existing household classifications prepared by BKKBN.  
   15 
Scholarships were to be allocated to children from households in the two lowest 
BKKBN rankings. If there were a large number of such eligible students, then 
additional indicators to be applied were to identify the neediest students. These 
additional indicators included distance of family homes from school, physical 
handicaps and family size. Also, at least half of the total number of scholarships, were 
to be allocated to girls. 
 
IV.  The Impact of Household Participation in the SSN Programs 
A.  The Impact on Consumption 
The SSN programs were aimed to help the poor and the newly poor in coping 
with the negative effects of the crisis. When the crisis struck  a large number of 
people were adversely affected, to the point that informal social protection became 
largely ineffective  the poor and the newly poor were thus in a situation whereby 
they were unable to cope with the effects of the crisis and outside help was required. 
This section evaluates the performance of the SSN programs; in boosting household 
consumption, helping the non-poor avoid falling into poverty, and helping the already 
poor escape poverty. 
Table 5 examines the impact that household participation in the SSN programs 
had on consumption. The table shows the results of estimates whereby the change in 
log real per capita consumption is regressed on the change in log real per capita 
income (net of SSN income), village cluster of mean change in log real per capita 
income (net of SSN income), participation in the SSN programs, asset ownership, and 
lag of participation in social organizations. Two estimations are given, in column A 
the variable of village cluster of mean change in log real per capita income is 
excluded while in column B this variable is included. The estimations in column B are 
given in order to take into account Townsend’s findings (1994), that changes in 
household consumption rates are determined by what happens to everybody else in 
the village, indicating that a household’s consumption rate is insured by the 
community where it lives. 
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Table 5.  The Impact of Participation in the Social Safety Net Programs 
on Household Consumption 
(Dependent variable: Change in log real per capita consumption) 
Independent variable A B 
Constant -0.0128* 
(-2.353) 
-0.0323** 
(-5.820) 
Change in log real per capita income (net of SSN 
income) 
0.2932** 
(98.770) 
0.2777** 
(89.208) 
Village cluster of mean change in log real per capita 
income (net of SSN income) 
- 0.1432** 
(15.821) 
Participation in SSN programs:   
- Subsidized rice 0.0277** 
(7.594) 
0.0346** 
(9.454) 
- Scholarship 0.0153 
(1.893) 
0.0157* 
(1.949) 
- Medical services 0.0181** 
(2.967) 
0.0167** 
(2.744) 
- Nutrition -0.0272** 
(-2.826) 
-0.0251** 
(-2.620) 
- Employment Creation 0.0132* 
(2.130) 
0.0151** 
(2.446) 
- Subsidized Credit 0.0061 
(0.698) 
0.0042 
(0.482) 
Assets ownership:   
- Radio/tape recorder 0.0157** 
(4.174) 
0.0146** 
(3.910) 
- Television -0.0103** 
(-2.491) 
-0.0113** 
(-2.752) 
- Refrigerator -0.0052 
(-0.661) 
-0.0040 
(-0.508) 
- Telephone 0.0089* 
(2.399) 
0.0097** 
(2.630) 
- Dish antenna -0.0111 
(-1.273) 
-0.0121 
(-1.388) 
- Bicycle 0.0017 
(0.457) 
0.0032 
(0.832) 
- Motorbike 0.0031 
(0.589) 
0.0027 
(0.500) 
- Car 0.0029 
(0.320) 
0.0017 
(0.188) 
- Land 0.0045 
(1.161) 
0.0066 
(1.702) 
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Table 5. Continued 
Independent variable A B 
Lag of participation in social organizations:   
- PKK (housewives organization) 0.0064 
(1.182) 
0.0040 
(0.747) 
- Dasa Wisma (neighborhood organization) -0.0058 
(-0.981) 
-0.0022 
(-0.378) 
- Karang Taruna (youth organization) 0.0110 
(1.727) 
0.0098 
(1.536) 
- Kematian (burial services organization) 0.0004 
(0.094) 
-0.0008 
(-0.208) 
- Olah Raga (sports organization) -0.0156** 
(-3.041) 
-0.0131** 
(-2.560) 
- Keagamaan (religious organization) 0.0136** 
(3.568) 
0.0136** 
(3.591) 
- Arisan (community rotating saving groups) -0.0131** 
(-3.040) 
-0.0115** 
(-2.667) 
   
Survey round dummies Yes Yes 
   
R-squared 0.2976 0.2455 
   
Number of observations 31,847 31,847 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are t-values 
            ** = significant at 1 percent level 
              * = significant at 5 percent level 
 
 
The estimation results in column A indicate that the income elasticity of 
consumption is 0.29 and significant at a level of one percent, implying that a 10 
percent increase in income results in a three percent increase in consumption. Under 
the full insurance hypothesis, the value of this coefficient is zero, indicating that 
consumption is independent of income because households can insure consumption 
from any shock to income. On the other hand, under the no insurance hypothesis, the 
value of this coefficient is one, indicating that all shocks to income are fully 
transferred to consumption. The value of this coefficient, which is between zero and 
one, rejects both hypotheses and indicates a partial insurance of consumption. 
Households can partially insure their consumption levels from shocks to their 
incomes. 
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The estimated elasticity in column B is only slightly lower at 0.28 and 
significant at the one percent level. Meanwhile, the coefficient of village cluster of 
mean change in log real per capita income is 0.14 and is also significant at the one 
percent level. This means that communities do provide some insurance to a 
household’s consumption, however, the effect of a household’s own change in income 
is still greater than the community effect. This is different from Townsend’s findings 
(1994), who finds that the community effect eliminates the effect of change in a 
household own income. 
The coefficients of participation in the SSN programs are in general positive 
and significant. This implies that participation in the SSN programs generally helps 
households increase their consumption level. The exceptions to this include the 
subsidized credit program, which has an insignificant effect, and the nutrition 
program, which has a significantly negative effect on household consumption. 
The coefficients of asset ownership variables are mainly statistically 
insignificant, except for assets which include radio/tape recorders and telephones. The 
former have positive coefficients and the later, that is a television has negative 
coefficient. Participation in the three government created social organizations  
housewives, neighborhood, and youth organizations  as well as burial service 
organizations had no significant effect on household consumption. However, the 
coefficients of participation in sports organizations and community rotating savings 
groups were both negative and significant, while the coefficients of participation in 
religious organization were positive and significant. 
 
B.  The Impact on Avoiding Poverty 
To examine the effect of participation in the SSN programs on the ability of 
non-poor households to avoid falling into poverty, Table 6 shows the estimation 
results of probit regressions of the probability for non-poor households to fall into 
poverty. The sample group used for these estimations only included households which 
had either remained non-poor or changed from non-poor to poor in two consecutive 
survey rounds. In the estimations, a dummy variable of whether or not a household 
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fell into poverty was regressed on lag of log real per capita consumption, the change 
in log real per capita income (net of SSN income), village cluster of mean change in 
log real per capita income (net of SSN income), household participation in the SSN 
programs, assets ownership, and lag of participation in social organizations. The 
coefficients presented in the table are expressed in terms of the probability of a 
household falling into poverty.  
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Table 6. Probability of A Non-Poor Falling into Poverty 
(Dependent variable: Dummy of falling into poverty) 
Independent variable A B 
Lag of log real per capita consumption -0.2273** 
(-37.94) 
-0.2271** 
(-37.90) 
Change in log real per capita income (net of SSN 
income) 
-0.1005** 
(-37.34) 
-0.0978** 
(-34.83) 
Village cluster of mean change in log real per capita 
income (net of SSN income) 
- -0.0251** 
(-3.33) 
Participation in SSN programs:   
- Subsidized rice -0.0120** 
(-4.18) 
-0.0132* 
(-4.56) 
- Scholarship 0.0029 
(0.42) 
0.0028 
(0.42) 
- Medical services -0.0057 
(-1.21) 
-0.0053 
(-1.13) 
- Nutrition 0.0465** 
(4.68) 
0.0456** 
(4.60) 
- Employment Creation 0.0107* 
(2.04) 
0.0103* 
(1.97) 
- Subsidized Credit 0.0052 
(0.70) 
0.0058 
(0.78) 
Assets:   
- Radio/tape recorder -0.0051 
(-1.72) 
-0.0049 
(-1.66) 
- Television -0.0087** 
(-2.71) 
-0.0086** 
(-2.67) 
- Refrigerator -0.0205** 
(-2.71) 
-0.0207** 
(-2.73) 
- Telephone -0.0284** 
(-9.59) 
-0.0285** 
(-9.62) 
- Dish antenna -0.0171* 
(-2.06) 
-0.0167* 
(-2.01) 
- Bicycle -0.0199** 
(-6.70) 
-0.0202** 
(-6.80) 
- Motorbike -0.0108* 
(-2.42) 
-0.0107* 
(-2.38) 
- Car 0.0209* 
(2.16) 
0.0216* 
(2.22) 
- Land 0.0113** 
(3.57) 
0.0109** 
(3.44) 
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Table 6.  Continued 
Independent variable A B 
Lag of participation in social organizations:   
- PKK (housewives organization) -0.0027 
(-0.61) 
-0.0026 
(-0.58) 
- Dasa Wisma (neighborhood organization) -0.0016 
(-0.34) 
-0.0017 
(-0.34) 
- Karang Taruna (youth organization) 0.0030 
(0.58) 
0.0034 
(0.65) 
- Kematian (burial services organization) -0.0014 
(-0.45) 
-0.0015 
(-0.48) 
- Olah Raga (sports organization) 0.0008 
(0.19) 
-0.0002 
(-0.04) 
- Keagamaan (religious organization) -0.0022 
(-0.72) 
-0.0020 
(-0.66) 
- Arisan (community rotating saving groups) -0.0065 
(-1.90) 
-0.0066* 
(-1.95) 
   
Survey round dummies Yes Yes 
   
Pseudo R-squared 0.2609 0.2616 
   
Number of observations 21,471 21,471 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are z-values 
            ** = significant at 1 percent level 
              * = significant at 5 percent level 
 
 
The estimation results indicate that initial levels of consumption and change in 
incomes are important determinants to establish the probability of a household falling 
into poverty. The coefficient of lag of log real per capita consumption is –0.23 and 
significant at the one percent level. This implies that for each 10 percent increase in 
initial consumption, there is a two percent drop in the probability of falling into 
poverty. The coefficient of change in log real per capita income is –0.1 and significant 
at the one percent level. This implies that for each 10 percent increase in incomes, the 
probability of falling into poverty is reduced by one percent. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient of village cluster of mean change in log real per capita income is –0.03 and 
is also significant at the one percent level. This implies that with every 10 percent 
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increase in the villagers mean income the probability of a household in that village 
falling into poverty is reduced by 0.3 percent. 
Participation in various SSN programs has mixed effects on the probability of 
a household falling into poverty. However, only through participation in the 
subsidized rice program did a household probability of falling into poverty 
significantly decrease. A non-poor household which participated in this program had a 
one percent less probability of falling into poverty. On the other hand, a household 
which participated in the nutrition and employment creation programs has a higher 
probability of falling into poverty. These coefficients need to be interpreted carefully 
as they do not indicate that participation in these programs increase the chance of a 
household becoming poor. Instead, households which participated in these programs 
are perhaps those which experienced adverse shock, and the benefits of these 
programs were not sufficient in preventing them from falling into poverty. 
Meanwhile, the rest of the programs have no statistically significant effects on the 
probability of a household falling into poverty. 
Most asset ownership variables have statistically significant coefficients and 
many of those coefficients have negative signs. This implies that in general, owning 
assets reduces the probability of a household falling into poverty. The exceptions are 
car and land ownership, where the coefficients of these assets are positive. Perhaps 
this indicates that these two assets are less liquid than the other forms of assets 
because during a crisis it is not easy to find people who are willing to buy relatively 
valuable assets. Meanwhile, almost all of the variables of participation in social 
organizations have statistically insignificant coefficients, except for the community 
rotating saving groups which has a negative and significant coefficient. This implies 
that the participation of non-poor households in most social organizations are of no 
consequence in determining their probability of falling into poverty. Participation in 
community rotating saving groups, however, did reduce such probability. 
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C.  The Impact on Escaping Poverty 
To examine the effects of participation in SSN programs on the ability of poor 
households to move out of poverty, Table 7 shows the estimation results of probit 
regressions determining the probability for poor households to escape poverty. In 
these estimates, the sample included only households which either remained poor or 
changed from poor to non-poor in two consecutive survey rounds. In the estimations, 
a dummy variable of whether or not a household escaped from poverty is regressed on 
the same set of variables used in Table 6. The coefficients presented in the table 
determine the probability of a poor household moving out of poverty. 
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Table 7. Probability of A Poor Household Moving Out of Poverty 
(Dependent variable: Dummy of moving out of poverty) 
Independent variable A B 
Lag of log real per capita consumption 0.7198** 
(31.28) 
0.7192** 
(31.20) 
Change in log real per capita income (net of SSN 
income) 
0.2948** 
(31.07) 
0.2935** 
(29.54) 
Village cluster of mean change in log real per 
capita income (net of SSN income) 
- 0.0101 
(0.37) 
Participation in SSN programs:   
- Subsidized rice 0.0189 
(1.75) 
0.0195 
(1.78) 
- Scholarship -0.0700** 
(-3.71) 
-0.0701** 
(-3.71) 
- Medical services 0.0113 
(0.68) 
0.0111 
(0.66) 
- Nutrition -0.0641** 
(-2.70) 
-0.0641** 
(-2.70) 
- Employment Creation 0.0044 
(0.27) 
0.0044 
(-0.27) 
- Subsidized Credit -0.0191 
(-0.85) 
-0.0193 
(-0.86) 
Assets:   
- Radio/tape recorder 0.0428** 
(4.10) 
0.0427** 
(4.08) 
- Television 0.0458** 
(3.43) 
0.0457** 
(3.42) 
- Refrigerator 0.0821 
(1.85) 
0.0823 
(1.85) 
- Telephone 0.0820** 
(7.43) 
0.0822** 
(7.44) 
- Dish antenna -0.0022 
(-0.04) 
-0.0024 
(-0.05) 
- Bike 0.0641** 
(5.24) 
0.0641** 
(5.24) 
- Motorbike 0.0239 
(1.20) 
0.0240 
(1.21) 
- Car -0.0192 
(-0.44) 
-0.0194 
(-0.45) 
- Land -0.0574** 
(-4.24) 
-0.0573** 
(-4.23) 
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Table 7.  Continued 
Independent variable A B 
Lag of participation in social organizations:   
- PKK (housewives organization) 0.0108 
(0.61) 
0.0107 
(0.60) 
- Dasa Wisma (neighborhood organization) -0.0209 
(-1.08) 
-0.0207 
(-1.07) 
- Karang Taruna (youth organization) 0.0302 
(1.51) 
0.0302 
(1.51) 
- Kematian (burial services organization) -0.0229* 
(-2.02) 
-0.0230* 
(-2.03) 
- Olah Raga (sports organization) 0.0127 
(0.78) 
0.0128 
(0.78) 
- Keagamaan (religious organization) 0.0040 
(0.36) 
0.0040 
(0.36) 
- Arisan (community rotating saving groups) 0.0095 
(0.70) 
0.0097 
(0.71) 
   
Survey round dummies Yes Yes 
   
Pseudo R-squared 0.2151 0.2150 
   
Number of observations 10,376 10,376 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are z-values 
            ** = significant at 1 percent level 
              * = significant at 5 percent level 
 
 
Just like the probability of non-poor households falling into poverty, the 
probability of poor households moving out of poverty is also largely determined by 
their initial levels of consumption and changes in income. The coefficient of lag of 
log per capita consumption is 0.72 and significant at the one percent level. This 
implies that for each 10 percent increase in consumption of a poor household after the 
initial period, there is a seven percent higher probability for that household to move 
out poverty in the following period. In other words, the poor households whose 
consumption levels are only slightly lower than the poverty line have a higher 
probability of escaping poverty than the poor whose consumption levels are further 
below the poverty. 
The coefficient of the change in log real per capita income is 0.29 and 
significant at the one percent level. This implies that a 10 percent increase in income 
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raises the probability of moving out of poverty by almost three percent. Meanwhile, 
the coefficient of the village cluster of mean change in log real per capita income is 
statistically insignificant. This means that what happens to the rest of the villagers 
does not effect the chance of a poor household in the village moving out of poverty. 
All variables of household participation in the SSN programs have 
insignificant coefficients, with the exception of the scholarship and nutrition programs 
which have negative and significant coefficients. This means that participation in the 
SSN programs did not improve the probability of a poor household moving out of 
poverty. In fact, participation in the scholarship and nutrition programs had negative 
effects on the probability of a poor household moving out of poverty.
11
 This probably 
relates to the opportunity cost of schooling. What these results imply is that the 
benefits accrued by poor households from the SSN programs are too small to have an 
impact on their chances of escaping poverty. 
Some of the asset ownership variables have positive and statistically 
significant coefficients. These indicate that asset ownership improves poor households 
chances of moving out of poverty. The exception is land ownership, the coefficient on 
owning land is negative and significant. Meanwhile, most of the variables of 
participation in social organizations have statistically insignificant coefficients, 
implying that such participation does not help a poor household to escape poverty. In 
fact, participating in a burial service organization significantly reduced the probability 
that a poor household would move out of poverty. 
 
V. JPS Interaction with Community Efforts and Sectoral Programs 
Poorly designed JPS programs can weaken those “informal” safety nets 
provided by the family and the local community, as well as undermining existing 
efforts and institutions. The facts are: (a) people have mainly relied on themselves, 
their families, and their local communities and groups to cope with the crisis;  (b) the 
portion of the budget allocated for JPS programs have been quite small and, aside 
                                                          
11
 This is of course ignoring the long term impact through return to education. 
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from the food security program, only small numbers of people have actually benefited 
and (c) even those benefits  typically only constitute a small fraction of total 
household expenses. This means that it is important that the formal JPS programs do 
not undermine the much larger and more important existing “informal” safety nets. 
Micro-credit.  An example of the conflict between on-going efforts and JPS 
programs is in the area of micro-credit. Many believe that providing the poor with 
access to credit can be an important means of economic empowerment enabling them 
a sustainable escape from poverty. Long experience has taught several lessons about 
how to implement a micro-credit program successfully: (a) credit should be at cost 
recovering (if not “market”) interest rates, (b) repayments should be maintained, (c) 
credit through group guarantee of repayment is a useful way of ensuring repayment 
and saves on administrative costs — but these groups should be formed around pre-
existing groups or groups with a natural social affinity.  
Some programs, such as the PDM-DKE, have attempted to strengthen the local 
economy through the operation of credit. This credit however, does not specify a 
fixed interest rate, so that in many locations the interest rate have been zero.  The 
program has lent to groups which have been formed just to receive this credit, and the 
repayment terms have not been specified — in fact, in many cases there are no 
repayment terms. 
Many local groups who have been working for years to build sustainable micro-
credit programs, are sharply critical of the new JPS programs providing micro-credit, 
because they have undermined their own efforts. Borrowers who have been told for 
years of the necessity of high interest rates, group solidarity, and timely repayments 
suddenly see others in the community (and not always the worst off) receiving much 
larger amounts of credit with none of those features.
21
   
Employment creation.  Another example is the impact of labor creation 
programs on community self-help activities (gotong royong).  In most communities in 
Indonesia people are expected to contribute a certain amount of time per year to 
                                                          
21
 The operating manual of the PDMDKE was revised to create higher interest rates and fixed 
repayment periods for the revolving fund for economic activities. 
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activities which benefit the entire community.  Some of the employment-creation 
programs have paid people for activities that are traditionally carried out for free by 
the communities as part of the mutual known as ‘gotong royong. Many fear that this  
undermines future community ventures as people would either expect them to be done 
by the government or they expect to be paid.
22
  
During the crisis, one important if under-acknowledged function of the JPS 
programs has been to sustain funding for health and facilities at the lower level 
education.  This, however, is a temporary measure. An “exit strategy” is needed to 
reduce dependency on the JPS programs and reorient efforts to the overall sectoral 
agenda, but in manner which does not jeopardize the funding received indirectly 
through the JPS programs. 
 
VI. Some Lessons Learned from the Indonesian Experience  
The two-year Indonesian experience with the JPS program provides very 
useful lessons for designing and implementing social safety net programs, particularly 
in the context of developing countries. Below is a list of five lessons learned. 
First, the Indonesian experience shows that the capacity of the government or 
donors to respond to shocks with effective geographic targeting was hampered by a 
lack of up to date, complete, and accurate data. This is why reliable information is 
vital. Static administrative targeting is unable to catch newly poor, or shocked, 
households. When the crisis hit Indonesia, there were conflicting projections and 
differing assessments over the probable social impact, and there was no well-
designed, publicly accessible real-time information system that could assist those 
efforts to address the needs of either the traditionally poor or the newly poor resulting 
from the crisis. Such a system, complemented by data from other organizations, 
NGOs, and donors could play a key role in combating the negative effects of the 
crisis.    
                                                          
22
 The padat karya programs were eliminated after FY 98/99 and replaced with a single program in 
urban areas carrying out maintenance and small construction. 
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Second, designing and implementing large social safety net programs in a 
crisis situation at the central government level requires institutional commitment, 
supported by clear objectives and simple design. Implementation in the regions 
depends upon the capacity of local government and local community groups. At this 
level, clear targeting criteria and a reliable decision-making process are crucial to the 
effectiveness of the program. 
Third, although a simple design is important, there must still be some 
allowance for local flexibility in countries of the size and complexity of Indonesia. 
The OPK program is an example of a crisis initiative that worked well. It had a simple 
design using the National Logistics Bureau distribution channels to provide rice at 
subsidized prices to those with a National Family Planning Agency ‘poor card’. But 
pressure at the local level for a ‘fairer’ distribution of the rice was overwhelming, 
since the ‘almost poor’ or the ‘newly poor’ families had no entitlement to the 
subsidized rice. It appears that the emergence of flexibility during the implementation 
of this program actually improved targeting and in April 2000 the program design was 
changed to take this into account. 
Fourth, most long-term poverty alleviation measures or development strategies 
are unsuitable as social safety nets, especially in an emergency or crisis.  This is 
especially true of micro-credit. Not only new businesses unlikely to be successful 
during a crisis but the expansion of credit in an ‘emergency’ fashion can undermine 
the slow, patient and painstaking groundwork that successful micro-credit programs 
require. Further, once people perceive that the credit is a ‘transfer’ rather than a 
‘loan’, the programs are quickly abused through the widespread allocation of credits 
to powerful local individual as happened in Indonesia with some of the agricultural 
credit schemes.  
Fifth, the impact of household participation in the SSN programs on 
consumption in general is positive and significant. However, only participation in the 
subsidized rice program which significantly reduced the probability of a non-poor 
household falling into poverty. Similarly, there has largely been an insignificant 
impact on the probability for poor households to move out of poverty based on their 
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participation in the SSN programs. This implies that the benefits accrued by poor 
households from the SSN programs are too small to have an impact on their chances 
of escaping poverty. Hence, this suggests that SSN programs are not an effective tool 
for social redistribution.  
 
VII.  Some Ideas for Future Directions  
The social safety net programs in Indonesia were established due to the crisis. 
As the crisis will ultimately end, the question emerges regarding the future. Will these 
programs be simply terminated, or will they be maintained as part of a national 
strategy to provide social protection for the poor?
12
  
Before the crisis Indonesia did not have any social safety net programs, at least 
none like those which exist now. Hence, initially Indonesia was ill prepared to deal 
with the social problem which emerged. There is a need to learn from this experience: 
Indonesia should maintain and develop social safety net programs although on a much 
smaller scale and scope and with sufficient flexibility so that these initiatives can be 
expanded quickly when the need arises.  
In addition, the modernization of the Indonesia economy, increasing 
urbanization and formalization of the labor force, declining birth rate, and increasing 
life expectancy will all exert increasing pressure on the informal social protection 
system. Weaker informal protection mechanisms must be balanced by a stronger 
formal measures, including formal social safety nets.  
Consequently, the attempts which are now being considered in Indonesia to 
reform the system of social protection are timely.
13
 However, it is important to note 
                                                          
12
 Social protection programs include all actions that are aimed to (i) assist individuals, households, and 
communities to better manage risk, and (ii) provide support to the chronically poor (World Bank, 
2000a). 
13
 To redress past problems in social policy implementation the government is now working to improve 
both the planning and the implementation process in this area. This effort is being coordinated by the 
Office of the Vice President. The Vice President will be supported by a Steering Committee or Task 
Force on Poverty Reduction chaired by the Coordinating Minister for the Economy. The committee 
will be comprised of members from other ministries, central government institutions, civil society 
groups, parliament, and donors. The initial agreement for this task force was signed between 
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that there is no simple answer to the question of the extent to which Indonesia can 
afford social protection programs. Some 65 percent of the Indonesian work force is 
engaged in the informal sector, where there is no record of earnings, or potential for 
tax revenue. Hence, the goal of establishing ‘unemployment insurance’ and ‘social 
security’ to cover such workers remain problematic, and it will take some time for 
Indonesia to establish formal sector social protection programs. Nevertheless, 
Indonesia should start preparing for a period of transition, from a situation where 
these risks are handled informally through the family and the community to where 
these are tackled through formal structures.  
Drawing on the last three decades of remarkable achievement in poverty 
reduction and recent experience with the implementation of social safety net 
programs, Indonesia’s social policy strategy should at least include the following 
element: (i) the promotion of an economy free of favoritism and one conducive to 
labor intensive activities, with fair access and fair returns to assets (labor, land, natural 
resources, capital), (ii) public expenditure on the “essentials” — investments in 
human beings (health and education) and in basic infrastructure to create a suitable 
physical environment where the poor can be productive (roads, irrigation, water, 
urban services), (iii) public expenditure on well-designed community development 
programs which encourage growth in underdeveloped regions.  
We have learned that the adoption of these three measures will help the poor 
and the vulnerable to cope with risk and enable them to cope better with shocks. In 
addition, the government should also provide some basic income assistance to the 
small group of chronically poor, i.e. those who lack earning power such as widows, 
orphans, and the physically disabled. As for the much larger group who are 
occasionally and unexpectedly subject to life’s vicissitudes (losing a job, ill health), 
such individuals need a temporary hand — not a safety net but a safety trampoline 
that provides them with a temporary cushion but propels them back into productive 
activity. 
                                                          
Indonesian government and the UNDP in February 2001.  
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This paper has examined Indonesia’s expenditure on social safety nets during 
the crisis.  This expenditure was an important part of the government’s ‘crisis 
expenditure’ and the programs have been subject to a great deal of public scrutiny. In 
sharp contrast, however, other larger ‘crisis expenditure’ initiatives have not received 
the same level of scrutiny. The Indonesian government spent thirty times more on 
bailing out the financial sector than it did on social safety nets, while five times the 
social safety net expenditure was spent on a general energy subsidy that demonstrably 
did not benefit either the poor or the hardest hit households.
14
  
As Indonesia is presently embarking upon a major decentralization process, 
with power and authority being devolved from the center to the regions, the precise 
financing arrangements for future poverty reduction measures and social safety net 
program and the respective roles to be played by central and regional governments all 
need to be clarified.
15
  
One of the challenges for independent researchers and civil society in 
Indonesia is to ensure that the questions discussed above stay firmly on the 
government’s agenda. 
                                                          
14
 These are relevant and important comparisons. As argued in World Bank (2000b), these and other 
government initiatives should be judged by the extent to which they contribute to raising the broad 
standard of living of Indonesians, especially the poorest. 
15
 At the CGI meeting in October 2000 the government proposed the following strategy: ‘the central 
government can set the criteria by which the provinces will select the poor areas to receive funds and 
create incentives which will reward provinces for allocating the funds to the poor areas within their 
jurisdiction’. 
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